A Characterization of Sapient Agents by Otterlo, Martijn van et al.
KIMAS 2003 BOSTON, USA 
A Characterization of Sapient Agents 
Martijn van Otterlo 
TKI, Dept. of Computer Science, 
University of Twente, The Netherlands 
Marco Wiering, Mehdi Dastani and John-Jules Meyer 
Intelligent Systems Group, 
Utrecht University, The Netherlands 
e-mail: otterlo@cs.utwente.nI e-mail: {marco,mehdi,jj} @cs.uu.nl 
Abstract- This paper presents a proposal to characterize 
Sapient Agents in terms of cognitive concepts and abilities. In 
particular, a sapient agent is considered as a cognitive agent 
the learns its cognitive state and capabilities through experience. 
This characterization is based on formal concepts such as beliefs, 
goals, plans and reasoning rules, and formal techniques such as 
relational RL. We identify several aspects of cognitive agents 
that can be evolved through learning and indicate how these 
aspects can be learned. Other important features such as the 
social environment, interaction with other agents or humans and 
the ability to deal with emotions, will also be discussed. The paper 
ends with directions for further rsearcb on sapient agents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intelligent agents have already found their way to the public, 
and during the last decades many intelligent agents have been 
shown to be effective in solving particular tasks. However, 
an intelligent agent is often used for a single task only, e.g., 
think about a chess playing program which is only used to play 
chess. If an agent has to fulfil multiple tasks, more complicated 
issues arise, such as a decision method for choosing the current 
goals based on current information about the environment and 
refining the decision method based on learning capability. 
Making the transition from intelligent agent to agents that 
decide autonomously and learn to refine their decision making 
capability. requires some new type of agent. This type of agent 
will he referred to as a sapient agent. 
We will look upon sapient agents, from the starting perspec- 
tive of cognitive agents extended with (relational reinforce- 
ment) learning capabilities. A cognitive agent is assumed to 
have some internal state consisting of mental attitudes such 
beliefs, goals, and plans, receives inputs through its sensors, 
and performs actions. The actions are decided on based on its 
mental state in such a way that its effort to attain a goal will 
he minimal. For this many reasoning mechanisms could he 
useful such as logical deduction, neural networks, fuzzy logic, 
Bayesian networks etc. We consider an agent in  which all of 
these mechanisms may run in parallel. E.g. pattern recognition 
may be done using neural networks, whereas communication 
is best done using logical languages. 
In this paper we will first characterize sapient agents, and 
then describe how we can use learning methods for sapient 
agents. 
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In section I1 we define sapient agents starting from the 
notion of a cognitive agent. We discuss a general cognitive 
architecture, the deliberation cycle and possible influences 
stemming from emotions. In section IV we will describe the 
reinforcement learning paradigm, as well as recent extensions 
important for sapient agents. Section V will discuss the 
learning opportunities in the cognitive architecture defined in 
section 111-A and proposes some solutions in the framework 
of reinforcement learning. Section VI will discuss the broader 
context of sapient agents; the interaction with other agents 
and communication and social issues, with both humans and 
agents. In section VI1 we will reflect on the characterization 
given in this paper and give directions for further research. 
11. DEFINING SAPIENT AGENTS 
Sapient agents are assumed to have accumulated learning 
and knowledge, the ability to discem inner qualities and 
relationships, often called the agent’s insight, and good sense 
or judgments. These concepts and properties are, however, not 
intuitive and informal without explicit formal semantics. In 
this paper, we consider sapient agents as a specific type of 
cognitive agents for which many formalizations are proposed. 
In particular, we believe that properties such as knowledge, 
insight, and judgments of sapient agents are related to, and 
should be defined in terms of, mentalistic concepts such 
as beliefs, goals, and plans as used for cognitive agents. 
Therefore, we propose an interpretation of properties of sapient 
agents based on mentalistic concepts of cognitive agents and 
identify certain problems such as the integration of learning 
and decision making processes that together influence the 
behavior of sapient agents. 
We assume that insight and judgment properties of sapient 
agents determine their course of actions. For cognitive agents 
the course of actions can be specified in terms of their mental 
attitudes which contain at least beliefs, goals, and norms, 
capabilities such as actions and plans, reasoning rules that can 
be used to reason about the mental attitudes, communication, 
and sensing. Given the above mentioned entities, the decision 
making ability of agents can be considered as consisting of 
reasoning about mentalistic attitudes, selecting goals, planning 
goals, selecting and executing plans, etc[ll. 
In our view, the judgment of an agent can be considered at 
the lowest level as making choices about how to reason ahout 
its mental attitudes at each moment in time. For example, 
an agent’s judgment can be established by reasoning about 
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its goals or by reasoning about its goals only when they are 
not reachable using any possible plan. Some more moderate 
alternatives are also possible. E.g. the agent can create a plan 
for a goal and execute the plan. If this leads to a stage where 
the plan cannot he executed any furtber, then the agent can 
start reasoning about the plan and revise the plan if necessary. 
If the goal can still not be reached, then the agent can revise 
the goal. So, this leads to a strategy where one plan is tried 
completely and if it fails the goal is revised or even abandoned. 
In general, an agent with the judgment ability should be able 
to control the relation between plans and goals. For example, 
an agent should control whether a goal still exists during the 
execution of the plan to reach that goal. If the corresponding 
goal of a plan is reached (or dropped), the agent can allow or 
avoid continuing with the plan. 
We consider the insight of agents to be directly related to 
the ability of agents to evaluate their mental states and mental 
capabilities. We therefore assume that the insight ability is 
the ability to learn how to reason about mental attitudes 
and thus how to make decisions. The reasoning capability 
determines the agent’s decision making behavior and the 
learning capability determines the evolution of the reasoning 
capability through experiences. The focus of this paper with 
respect to the agent’s insight is on the aspects of the agent’s 
mental state and mental capabilities that are influenced by the 
learning process. These could be the goals, beliefs, desires, 
reasoning rules of even basic capabilities (the agent can learn 
new actions). 
111. COGNITIVE AGENTS 
In this section, we consider various aspects of the mental 
states and mental abilities of cognitive agents that may evolve 
through learning and from experiences resulting in properties 
associated with the sapient agents. In general, cognitive agents 
are assumed to have mental states consisting of mental atti- 
tudes such as beliefs, goals, plans, and reasoning rules [2], 
[31, [41, [51, [61, [71. For example, a cognitive agent may 
believe there is no coffee available, desire to drink coffee, 
and desire to have tea if there is no coffee. Moreover, the 
behavior of cognitive agents, i.e. the actions it chooses and 
performs, are assumed to be determined by deliberating on 
the mental attitudes [Z], [l], [8]. The deliberation process 
is a continuous and iterative process that involves many 
choices and decisions through which actions are selected and 
performed. For example, a deliberation process may select one 
goal, plan the goal and execute the plan. If the goal cannot 
be planned, it may either drop the goal or revise it. The 
revised goal may be planned. It is also possible that a plan 
cannot be executed since some of its constituting actions are 
blocked. In such a case, the agent may either decide to drop 
the plan or revise it. The existing proposals of cognitive agents 
[41, 151, [I], 161, [71 assume that many of these choices and 
decisions are fixed. These choices and decisions are based 
on predefined criteria and remain unchanged during agent’s 
lifetime. In this section, we introduce a general architecture 
for cognitive agents and discuss possible choices and decisions 
that are involved in the deliberation process. 
A. A Cognitive Agent Architecture 
In this section, we consider a general architecture for 
cognitive agent consisting of the representation of mental 
attitudes and the deliberation process. This agent architecture 
is illustrated in figure 1. According to this architecture, an 
agent observes the environment and communicates with other 
agents. The observation of an agent provides the facts that the 
agent recognizes from its sensory information. These facts can 
be used to update the agent’s mental state. The communication 
provides information that an agent receives from other agents. 
The received information are messages that are stored in 
the message box (Mesg.) of the agent. These messages can 
be represented in terms of the identifier of the sender and 
receiver, a logical sentence that determines the content of the 
message, and a performative which indicates the modality of 
the message, i.e. whether the content is meant to inform the 
receiver, contains requests for the receiver, etc. 
Fig. 1. A genemi airhiicerun for eogniiive ogenir. 
The beliefs of an agent represent its general world knowl- 
edge as well as its knowledge about the surrounding envi- 
ronment. The beliefs are usually represented by sentences of 
a logical language, e.g. sentences of a first order predicate 
langauge. The goals represent the states that the agent desires 
to reach. Like beliefs, goals are represented by sentences of a 
logical language as well. Actions represent basic capabilities 
that agent can perform. These actions can be cognitive actions 
such as belief updates, or extemal (physical) actions such 
as communication or movement actions. The actions are 
usually specified by pre- and post-conditions which are belief 
formulae. The plans represent structured pattems of actions 
that agent can perform together. 
B. Acting, Planning and Deliberating 
A planning rule expresses that a goal can be achieved by 
performing a plan under a certain belief condition. A planning 
rule has the form 4 t p I T, which indicates that goal 4 can 
be achieved by plan r if belief condition /3 holds. A goal 
rule determines how to modify a goal under a certain belief 
condition. A goal rule has the form 4 + p I 11 which indicates 
that goal 4 can be revised as goal 11 if belief condition /3 holds. 
Likewise, a plan rule determines how to modify a plan under 
a certain belief condition. A plan rule has the form ?r e p 1 T’ 
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which indicates that plan li can be revised as plan ?r’ if belief 
condition 0 holds. 
Cognitive agents deliberate on these concepts to decide 
which actions to perform at each moment of time [9]. The 
deliberation process involves many activities such as applying 
a reasoning rule for the above mentioned purposes, selecting a 
goal to achieve, selecting a plan to execute, generating a plan 
to achieve a goal, etc. In particular, a cognitive agent decides 
at each moment of time which activity to perform. It should be 
noted that different applications require different deliberation 
processes and that there is not one single universal deliberation 
process. An example of a deliberation process is the following 
iterative procedure: 
repeat 
Find and apply goal rules that are applicable 
Find and apply plan rules that are applicable 
Find a goal and a planning rule which is applicable to it 
Apply the selected planning rule to the selected goal 
Find and execute a plan 
end repeat 
In order to specify, design, and implement a cognitive agent 
one needs to initialize its cognitive state and specify, design, 
and implement various decisions and choices involved in the 
deliberation process beforehand. For example, the agent de- 
signer should develop beforehand various selection functions 
to select goals, plans, and various types of rules at various 
stages of the deliberation process. Also, the agent designer 
should indicate beforehand how goals and plan are generated 
and dropped. For many types of agents, especially sapient 
ones, it is not possible, or even desirable, to specify all these 
concepts at design-time. Therefore, sapient agents should be 
capable of learning. 
C. Emotions 
Emotions will also be important for truly sapient agents. 
Emotional attitudes towards agents, objects, events etc. can 
become important in the process of acting, planning and 
deliberation. Emotions motivate and bias behavior, but they 
do not completely determine it. They play a reflective role 
in decision making and learning [,lo], may monitor planning 
and may be prospect-based [ I l l .  By focusing on emotion- 
inducing events, the agent can decide more effectively. Basic 
emotions such as fear can trigger behavior needed to act fast, 
or to quickly change plans. Emotions such as happiness can 
influence choices for certain goals or plans. In some sense, 
emotions complement ratio so that the agent becomes wiser, 
more sapient. 
It is acknowledged that, at least in humans, emotions are not 
a separate process from cognition, but both are inextricably 
intertwined. It can even be stated that without emotions, 
decision-making and acting is hardly possible and that reason 
itself uses emotions to guide its decision making processes 
[12]. Even though some may argue that it is not important 
for machines (agents) to actually hove emotions, it surely is 
important to he able to reason about emotions. Especially in 
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situations in which natural language understanding and co- 
operative problem solving are important. When interaction 
with humans is involved. a capability to deal with emotions. 
whether to express or to understand, becomes highly desirable 
or even needed. [IO]. 
IV. LEARNING 
There is general agreement nowadays that intelligent agents 
should be adaptive, i.e. capable of learning. For learning to  
work, agents should be able to make the proper generalizations 
to reuse learned knowledge to apply it to new situations 
similar to encountered ones. For sapient agents learning as 
a capability should be extended to learning how to organize 
the deliberation cycle. Sapient agents can learn how to solve 
multiple tasks in parallel, how to deal with multiple goals and 
also how to set the right priorities. They can use their own 
experiences but also the social context for doing this. 
There are roughly three learning paradigms. Unsupervised 
and supervised learning are used mainly for isolated clustering 
and classification tasks, respectively. However, for agents, the 
reinforcement learning paradigm is dominant. given the fact 
that it deals with behavior learning. In the following sections 
we will describe its main features and discuss extensions 
useful for learning within (cognitive) sapient agents. 
A. Reinforcement Learning 
In reinforcement learning (RL) [13], an agent learns how 
to behave by interacting with its environment (including other 
agents) using a trial and error process. The agent has to learn a 
policy to decide on actions based on its mental state in such a 
way that its cumulative intake of rewards will be maximized. 
In general, RL methods learn estimates of utility values for 
certain belief states and certain actions. These values can be 
used to determine optimal actions for the agent’s current state. 
We can see an agent with RL capabilities as an agent that tries 
to find out which goal to select and how to achieve the selected 
goal with minimal efforts. RL has already been successfully 
applied to learn to play the game of backgammon at human 
world class level [14]. 
B. Abstraction in Reinforcement Learning 
Although RL is a general method for behavior learning, 
standard RL is not powerful enough for the rich knowledge 
structures and capabilities of sapient agents. Recently a num- 
ber of extensions to the RL framework have been developed 
that deal with various kinds of higher-order abstractions. 
Abstractions over actions (or time, i.e. temporal abstraction) 
can be used to abstract over different ways an abstract action 
can he instantiated. For example, an action moveTo(room1) 
can abstract over a number of motor-actions actually needed 
for a robot to move to rooml. Whole action sequences can 
be abstracted into a plan or a macro-action. Methods that use 
abstraction over time or action sequences are termed hierar- 
chical RL methods [15], [16], [17l. Hierarchies of actions and 
behaviors can be defined or even be learned. 
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Another recent direction in RL involves abstraction by 
using more powerful representation languages. Quite naturally, 
cognitive concepts like beliefs about the world and goals are 
expressed in terms of objects and relations. Traditionally, RL 
has been using feature-based and propositional representa- 
tions for representing cognitive concepts and actions, although 
for logic-based agents, richer representational formalisms are 
needed. Recently progress has been made in closing the 
gap between logic-based agent formalisms and methods for 
learning behavior such as RL. 
On the one hand, formalisms such as the Situation Calculus 
[lg] have been extended with means to calculate values for 
actions and mental states [19]. These values enable the agent 
to choose rationally between goals and actions. On the other 
hand, progress has been made in upgrading RL methods 
towards richer representational formalisms. Relational Rein- 
forcement kaming  ([20], [21], [22] methods learn values for 
relational expressions over mental concepts and actions. By 
means of logical induction, useful concepts that are important 
for optimal behavior of the agent, can be learned from experi- 
ence. These concepts are expressed in terms of knowledge the 
agent has, and based on actual experience gained in performing 
different actions. 
By integrating value-based behavior learning methods such 
as RL, the notion of a logic-based cognitive agent, and concept 
induction methods, behavior learning of an agent can be 
directly connected to cognitive notions, represented in terms 
of objects and relations [23]. 
V. LEARNING IN COGNITIVE AGENTS 
In section III-B we mentioned the fact that in cognitive 
agent architectures, many aspects are specified beforehand. 
However, for a sapient agent we believe that various choices 
and decisions involved in the deliberation process should be 
learned through experience instead of being fixed and defined 
beforehand. 
A. Adapting the Deliberation Cycle 
There are many opportunities for learning in cognitive 
agents. In particular, the agent should learn at run time 
various concepts (car(.), facts (car(p)), and rules (e.g. 
bin+) + f l y ( z ) )  that constitute its beliefs. Moreover, given 
goal formulae 4 and +, plan expressions A and A‘, and belief 
formula 0, the following can be the subject of learning with 
regards to the agent’s goals and plans: - Which goal to select in order to plan, and which plan 
to select in order to execute? Two types of selection 
functions can be learned. The goal selection functions 
should be learned based on the agent’s beliefs and the 
plan selection functions should be learned based on the 
agent’s beliefs and goals. 
Which goal or plan to generate in certain situations? This 
can be achieved by learning goal or plan rules of the form 
T + 0 I 4 and T +- p 1 R,  respectively. 
Which goal or plan to drop in certain situation? This can 
be achieved by learning goal or plan rules of the form 
4 e p I T and R t 0 I e, (where L is the empty plan) 
respectively. 
Which goal or plan to modify in certain situation? This 
can be achieved by learning goal or plan rules of the form 
4 t p I - How to plan a goal in a certain situation? This can be 
achieved by learning planning rules of the form 4 t p 1 
Finally, for each type of rules a selection function should 
be learned that selects a rule to apply at each moment of time. 
These selection functions should be learned based on agent’s 
mental state and differ for each type of rules. In particular, the 
selection function for planning rules should be learned based 
on agent’s beliefs, goals, and plans, the selection function for 
plan rules should be learned based on agent’s beliefs and 
goals, and the selection function for goal rules should be 
learned based on agent’s beliefs. In the following section we 
discuss how these aspects can be learned by various learning 
techniques. 
B. Learning Goals, Plans and Concepts 
In order to cope with the demands of a sapient agent 
described in the previous section, we can use hierarchical RL 
(using relational representations). We consider goal-selection 
and plan-selection first. 
For goal-selection, the agent has to map its beliefs to a 
particular goal which it will adopt. Each time-step the agent 
can change its mind about the goal, but in order to allow 
the agent to continue with one particular goal, we can use a 
mapping from beliefs and the previous goal to a newly selected 
goal. Reinforcement learning algorithms learn value functions 
for this by trial and error using e.g. Q-learning [241. The goal is 
to learn to select goals leading to the maximal average reward 
intake per time-step. By trying out goals, and using plans or 
actions to achieve these goals, the agent gets estimates about 
the quality-value (Q-value) of selecting each of its goals given 
some mental states. Since the agent can at any time change its 
goal, it can drop previous goals and continue with new ones. 
It can also learn that committing to some goal is good until 
some mental state tells the agent to adopt another goal. Thus, 
using the hierarchical RL framework, selecting and revising 
goals may be learned just as learning action sequences. 
For learning to select plans, the agent has to map a goal 
and beliefs. to a plan. There can be multiple plans, some 
plans may even consist of single actions. Although some plans 
take longer than single actions, this is not any problem if 
hierarchical RL is being used. The agent can even choose to 
invoke a planner which will then plan at a specific time-step. 
If this planner returns useful plans given some mental state, 
it will be invoked more often in that context. Plans can be 
dropped or revised at any time, since the agent selects a plan 
or action at each time step. Thus, again using the hierarchical 
RL framework, selecting and revising plans can he learned 
just as learning action sequences. 
Finally, the agent has to learn to map sensory information 
obtained by for example cameras to concepts. This can be 
and R + p I R’, respectively. 
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done by using pattem recognition methods such as neural 
networks or support vector machines. Each time the agent 
receives sensory information and does not understand what 
it sees, it should get feedback about the concept it is looking 
at. This can only be done in a social setting in which humans 
communicate with the agent, and the agent is also able lo 
communicate with other agents. We will examine this issue 
further in section VI. 
C. Emotions in Leaming 
Emotions may influence behavior as was explained in sec- 
tion 111-C. Emotions may also influence learning. For example, 
a negative emotion that produces a bad feeling may trigger 
reassessment of what causes the bad feeling, followed by 
learning how to avoid it in the future. A sapient agent can also 
predict that by not doing an action, it will feel even worse, 
and by feeling this, it can interrupt its current behavior to do 
that action. Emotions can also help focus on a goal, or trigger 
to reassess a situation (e.g. by insight, reflection) and look for 
a way to improve it, thus adapting the behavior. 
VI. THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Agents, especially sapient ones, will usually be sifuated in 
complex, multi-agent, social environments in which they have 
to interact with other agents and humans. Such complex envi- 
ronments create difficulties, but also opportunities, especially 
in learning. We will discuss some of these in this section. 
Reinforcement Learning has already been applied success- 
fully for solving particular multi-agent problems such as 
network routing [ E ] ,  elevator control [26], and traffic light 
control [27]. For all these problems, the agent still has to solve 
a particular task such as controlling a specific traffic light and 
therefore these agents are not sapient at all. We can use multi- 
agent systems to make i t  easier for agents to learn to become 
sapient agents, however. 
If the agent has to learn to achieve a goal and it can choose 
which task to learn, there are several complicated issues. In 
some sense, the agent has to devote its time to learn something 
useful. But what if the agent is unable to learn to solve a 
particular task? When should it stop trying to learn the task? 
And also, how much reward can it expect when it would be 
able to learn to perform the task? A solution is to let the 
agent leam from other agents. For example, the agent can 
estimate its learning time by looking at other agents, or by 
communicating with them. The agent can also ask the reward 
functions of other agents, it can estimate the learning time 
by asking or looking at the other agent, and the agent can 
even ask the decision skill to solve a particular task to another 
agent. Thus, some issues seem complicated, but may become 
easier when the agent is not alone in the world. Although the 
whole system would become much more complex, particular 
subproblems are easier to solve. Some problems would even be 
impossible if the agent cannot learn by imitating other agents. 
For example, suppose one agent, a robot, approaches a deep 
canyon and just near the edge, it slips and falls into the canyon. 
Because of the fall, the agent is destroyed and it discontinues 
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to exist. The only way of learning that one should not come 
too close to the edge of the canyon is to look at the results of 
other agents approaching it. Since it is easy to see that coming 
too close to the edge of the canyon was bad for the other agent, 
a sapient agent can leam that this is a wrong action in this 
context. 
In multi-agent settings we have to distinguish between com- 
petitive, co-operative, and semi-competitive settings. Although 
we would like all agents to be cooperative, this is not realistic 
since each agent tries to maximize its own average reward 
intake per time-step. However, even in (semi-)competitive 
settings it makes sense to let agents communicate (e.g. if 
two agents try to walk through the same corridor and bump 
against each other, they can signal to which side they will go). 
By communicating knowledge, agents can share experiences, 
concepts and procedural knowledge of how to solve tasks. 
Using communication, possibly with humans, is also a good 
way to get a lot of examples for learning to classify sensory 
information into concepts. These are examples of leaming 
by communicating. Classical experiments show that in many 
cases, communication between agents can have a positive 
influence on learning behavior, provided that communicated 
information is useful and not superfluous [28]. On the other 
hand, agents can also learn how to communicate [29]. This 
involves learning what, when, with whom and how to com- 
municate. Social laws, protocols and shared ontologies are 
important factors in communication. 
Agents can learn to judge just like other agents, and agents 
can reward each other using ethical or social laws which have 
already existed for a long time and therefore may be evolved 
or preprogrammed. Thus, in multi-agent systems judgment 
and insight can also be learned, obtained, and refined using 
communication. For communication between agents some 
issues such as trust (insight in relationships) plays an important 
role and has to be learned based on the experiences of the 
agent. If another agent provides wrong estimates about the 
learning time or reward for solving a particular task, or it 
gives a wrong decision skill for solving the task, the agent 
can learn that this agent cannot be trusted. The agent can also 
ask other trusted agents, whether they trust another agent. In 
this way social relationships among agents can evolve. 
The problem of using reward functions is that it is difficult 
to say how much reward one should get for task A relative 
to task B. The decision of the agent will be to do the task 
leading to maximal average reward per time-step. However, 
if these relative reward values are incorrect, the agent could 
always do one single task at which it is good. Therefore the 
reward function should also be dynamic, where a reward is 
given only under particular circumstances. The reward could 
be made dependent on the agent’s emotions such as boredom, 
pride, pity, disappointment, satisfaction, anger, etc. In this 
way, an agent who is angry with another agent may learn 
not to communicate interesting information. Also if the agent 
is bored with its current task, it will get less reward for doing 
it, and therefore may switch to another goal. 
KlMAS 2003 BOSTON. USA 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 151 M. d'lnvema, D. Kinny, M. Luck, and M. Wooldridge, "A  formal spec- 
ififation of MARS:' io Agent Theories, Architectuns, nnd Languages, 
1997. pp, 155-176, 
161 K. V. Hindriks. F. S. D. Boer, W. V. der Hoek. and J L l .  C. Meyer, "'Agent 
programming in 3apl:' Autonomous Agents and Mulli-&enr Systems. 
vol. 2. no. 4. pp. 357401, 1999. 
171 J. B ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .  M. ~as t an i .  1. ~u l s t i j n ,  and L. van der Tom,  "Goal 
generation in the BOlD architecture:' Cognitive Science Quarterly, vol. 
In this paper we have given a characterization of sapient 
agents. By starting from the notion of a cognitive agent, for 
which many formalizations exist, we place cognitive notions . 
such as beliefs, desires, goals, and plans at the core Of the 
deliberation cycle of a sapient agent. Furthermore, with this - 
as a starting point, we have a firm basis for a model of true 
sapience as well as that we can take advantage from existing 
knowledge and formalizations concerning the modelling of 
cognitive notions, logic-based systems and agent programming 
languages such as 3AF'L. 
Furthermore, we have emphasized the need for managing 
control over different tasks that can be performed in parallel, 
by choosing constantly between actions, goals and plans in 
the deliberation cycle. Various tasks can also be run in parallel 
on different cognitive levels. On the perceptual level, pattern 
recognition can transform visual images to (logical) concepts, 
while planning and acting can be performed on a higher 
cognitive level. 
We have also stressed the importance of emotions as a 
possible factor in both behaving and learning. In a single agent, 
emotions may influence decision-making and planning. In a 
multi-agent, social context, emotions may play an important 
role in the interaction, especially when humans are involved. 
A very important feature of sapient agents that we discussed 
is learning. We discussed reasons, opportunities and solutions 
for learning. For sapient agents, learning transcends the idea 
of single-task learning by focusing on the whole deliberation 
cycle, emotional attitudes and the social context. Of much 
importance will he the integration of RL methods and logic- 
based, cognitive agents. Relational languages and hierarchical 
leaming methods in RL may function as a bridge between 
cognition and learning. 
One line of further research should focus first on formal 
definitions of the various parts discussed in this paper. Formal 
notions present in formalizations of cognitive agents and agent 
programming languages should be extended with learning 
mechanisms and emotional attitudes. 
A second line of research should aim at experimenting with 
and developing concrete applications of increasingly sapient 
agents. By integrating learning mechanisms such as relational 
RL into agent programming languages such as 3APL, ideas 
can be put to a test in order to develop truly sapient agents. 
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